Does executive ownership lead to excess target cash? The case of U.K. firms by Iona, Alfonsina et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1108/CG-02-2017-0028
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
 Iona, A., Leonida, L., & Ventouri, A. (2017). Does executive ownership lead to excess target cash? The case of
U.K. firms. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, 17(5), 876-895.
https://doi.org/10.1108/CG-02-2017-0028
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Corporate Governance
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does executive ownership lead to excess target cash? The 
case of U.K. firms 
 
 
Journal: Corporate Governance 
Manuscript ID CG-02-2017-0028.R1 
Manuscript Type: Original Article 
Keywords: 
Excess cash policy, Managerial ownership, Corporate governance 
characteristics. 
  
 
 
Corporate Governance
Corporate Governance
Does executive ownership lead to excess target cash? The case of U.K. firms 
 
April 25
th
, 2017 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: The aim of this paper is to investigate the dynamics between executive ownership 
and excess cash policy in the U.K. 
Design/methodology/approach: We identify firms adopting an excess policy using a joint 
criterion of high cash and cash higher than the target. Logit analysis is used to estimate the 
impact of executive ownership and other governance characteristics on the probability of 
adopting an excess cash policy. 
Findings: Results suggest that, in the U.K., the impact of the executive ownership on the 
probability of adopting an excess cash policy is non-monotonic, in line with the alignment-
entrenchment hypothesis. Our results are robust to different definitions of excess cash policy, 
to alternative specifications of the regression model, to different estimation frameworks and 
to alternative proxies of ownership concentration. 
Research implications: Our approach provides a new measure of the excess target cash for 
the firm. We show the need to identify an excess target cash policy not only by using an 
empirical criterion and a theoretical target level of cash, but also by capturing persistence in 
deviation from the target cash level. 
Originality/value: Actually, “how much cash is too much” is a question that has not been 
addressed by the literature. We address this question. Also, this amount of cash allows us to 
study the extent to which executive ownership contributes to explain the out-of-equilibrium 
persistency in the cash level. 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G30, G32, G34. 
Keywords: Excess cash policy, Managerial ownership, Corporate governance 
characteristics. 
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1. Introduction 
The large increase in corporate cash holdings over the last three decades has drawn the 
attention of researchers on the determinants of corporate cash level. A strand of corporate 
finance theory refers to the manager-shareholder agency conflict in explaining why some 
firms choose to hold substantial cash reserves. Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue 
that self-interested manager values financial flexibility, which allows him/her to escape the 
capital market discipline. In trading-off investment and dividends versus financial flexibility, 
the manager tends to give higher weight to the latter by accumulating cash reserves. A 
relatively large empirical literature provides evidence that firms that are subject to the 
manager-shareholder agency conflict tend to hold more cash. Large cash holdings allow 
managers to consume large amounts of perks and/or to invest in negative net present value 
projects that provide personal diversification benefits at the expenses of shareholders (Myers 
and Rajan, 1998; Harford, 1999; Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Pinkowitz et 
al., 2006; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford et al., 2008). 
Contrary to the majority of these studies, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) show that firms 
holding large amounts of cash do not perform any worse than other firms and high cash 
policies do not necessarily lead to value decreasing investments. 
A number of studies has attempted to answer the long standing question in corporate 
governance about whether managerial ownership influences the firm cash policy. Corporate 
governance theory argues that, if interests of managers are different from those of 
shareholders, shareholders can use managerial ownership to make managers acting in the best 
interest of shareholders. It is suggested that, while at low levels managerial ownership 
ensures the alignment of managers and shareholders' interests, at high levels it may lead to 
managerial entrenchment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck et al., 1988; McConnel and 
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Servaes, 1990; Stulz, 1988; 1990; Jensen, 1993; McConnel et al., 2008). As a result, the 
corporate governance debate on the effects of managerial ownership has investigated the 
potential role of the alignment-entrenchment effect of managerial ownership on cash policy. 
The existing literature provides mixed results. Some studies find an inverse 
relationship between managerial ownership and cash, while others find a positive or even a 
non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and cash levels. The vast 
majority of this research focuses on the U.S. economy (Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar et al., 
2007; Harford et al., 2008; Akguc and Choi, 2013; Gao et al., 2013) despite the evidence that 
executive directors in the U.K. are the second-largest shareholders class (Florakis and Ozkan, 
2009). The only exception which we are aware of is Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) that however 
focuses on the impact of the managerial ownership, not executive ownership, on the average 
cash level of U.K. firms. The underlying hypothesis is therefore that executive and non-
executive directors respond to alignment and entrenchment effects in a similar way, although 
it is known that insider and outsider directors have different theoretical roles and financial 
incentives (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Also, a distinction between executive and 
non-executive equity stakes is especially important from the perspective of U.K. Corporate 
Governance guidelines (Cadbury 1992; Higgs, 2003), which have specified the financial 
relationship of executive and non-executive directors within the firm (Filatotchev, 2007).  
Since U.K. shareholders prefer to compensate non-executive directors with cash rather 
than shares to protect their independence (Cadbury 1992; Higgs, 2003), we do not expect 
cash levels be significantly affected by non-executives’ shareholdings. On the contrary, we 
expect it to be significantly affected by executive shareholdings (Florakis, 2005; Mura, 
2007). In addition, while the Greenbury (1995) Report in the U.K. encourages executive 
directors to build up shares, the Company Act 1985 confers to executive directors with 5% 
voting stakes the power to propose counter-resolutions to resolutions proposed by other 
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shareholders and the obligation to disclose their strategic intent to shareholders only when 
their equity stake is between 5% and 15% of share capital. In light of this, we expect that 
outside this range executive directors might be more likely entrenched. There is, indeed, 
evidence that U.K. boards become entrenched at higher ownership levels than in their U.S. 
counterparts (Short and Keasey, 1999; Mura, 2007). 
The interest in shares held by executive directors is also reinforced by the evidence 
that in the U.K. a lack of external market discipline and efficient monitoring by financial 
institutions causes executive directors more likely to be entrenched (Franks et al., 2001; 
Goergen and Renneboog, 2001). Differently from the U.S., the U.K. boards are dominated by 
executive directors (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Pass, 2004) and non-executive directors 
have a more advisory, rather than a disciplinary, role (Franks et al., 2001; Petra, 2005). 
Coupled with a stronger minority investors’ protection in the U.K., this discourages the 
shareholders’ coalition and boosts the discretionary executives’ power. 
In this paper we shift our attention to U.K. firms and we examine the extent to which 
executive ownership, as a potentially effective mechanism of alignment of managers and 
shareholders’ interests, reduces the adoption of an excess cash policy. We test the hypothesis 
that at low levels executive ownership aligns interests of executive directors to those of 
shareholders and reduces the probability of adopting an excess cash policy, whereas at high 
levels it entrenches executives and increases the likelihood of adopting such a policy. The 
lack of prior studies on the U.K. firms, coupled with a more dispersed firms’ ownership 
structure and different corporate governance characteristics with respect to the U.S., makes 
the U.K. of particular interest. We focus explicitly on a group of firms that are likely to suffer 
from agency conflicts instead of examining the impact of executive ownership on the level of 
cash in the sample. To this aim, we define a sub optional amount of cash not only by using an 
empirical criterion and a theoretical target level of cash, but also by using a particular sample 
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period and by capturing persistence in deviation from the optimal cash level. Our approach 
provides us an empirical measure of the excess amount of cash for the firm. Actually, “how 
much cash is too much” is a question that has not been addressed by the literature; in turn, 
this amount of cash allows us to study the extent to which executive ownership contributes to 
explain the out-of-equilibrium persistency in the cash level. 
To the above aim, we (1) isolate firms persistently holding more cash than the optimal 
and (2) we isolate firms holding more cash than the necessary because of agency conflicts 
(Jensen, 1986) from those holding cash because of precautionary motives (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). We proceed along three lines. First, to analyse the impact of executive ownership on 
excess cash policy, we use observations over the 1990-2007 period. We exclude observations 
from 2008 onward as it is known that the financial crisis has significantly affected the firms’ 
cash flow, and adverse shocks to cash flow are an important part of the managers’ cash 
holdings decision especially when access to the capital market is costly (Bates, 2009; Brown 
and Petersen, 2011). Our choice is based upon preliminary evidence. The average cash to 
assets ratio of U.K. firms over the period 1990-2007 is about 13 percent. The financial crisis, 
beginning in the 2007, has caused a substantial increase in this level (up to 18.4 percent 
during the years 2007-2012). Moreover, as for the case of U.S. firms (Kahle and Stulz, 2013), 
during the crisis the cash to assets ratio for the U.K. firms shows an inverted U-shape path, 
with a sharp increase (19.7 percent) over the period 2007-2010 and a decrease (17 percent) 
during the years 2011-2012. 
Secondly, since the finance literature shows that cash is related to some firm-specific 
characteristics, we include, as control variables, a large number of corporate governance 
mechanisms and precautionary motives that are likely to impact the decision about the cash 
policy (Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Gillan, 2006; Bates et al., 2009; Chen and 
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Chuang, 2009; McKnight and Weir, 2009; Kuan et al., 2011 and 2012; Kusnadi, 2011; Gao et 
al., 2013). 
Third, to evaluate whether cash holdings are “abnormal” we estimate what the optimal 
cash holdings would be for the firm: “Ideally, we would have good theoretical models that 
would predict cash holdings given the known motivations for firms to hold cash. 
Unfortunately, such models do not exist” (Pinkowitz et al., 2013: 4). To provide a robust 
definition of cash in excess, we estimate an empirical model of optimal cash holdings 
commonly used in the literature (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009; Gao et al., 2013), and 
we recover persistent deviations from optimal cash. This criterion is used jointly with existing 
empirical approaches and a new classification strategy, based upon the evolution of the 
distribution of cash holdings over time. Our results support the hypothesis that in the U.K. 
managerial incentives pass through executive ownership. Moreover, results are in line with 
the alignment-entrenchment hypothesis. They show a non-monotonic relationship between 
executive ownership and the probability of adopting an excess cash policy. We check our 
results for robustness in a number of directions. We adopt different definitions of excess cash. 
For robustness purposes we use alternative specifications of the regression model, pooled and 
panel data estimation frameworks, alternative proxies of ownership concentration, and we 
check for endogeneity problems.  
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical 
methodology. Section 3 presents the data and the classification procedure. Section 4 discusses 
the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Empirical methodology 
2.1. The empirical model 
We estimate the following probability model: 
1				Pr	
	
ℎ, =
= ℎ, + 
!,
"
#$
+  %
&'(!,
)
#"*$
++,-,
.
,#$
++-
/
#$
+ 0, 
where 	
	
ℎ,	equals one if firm i is classified as adopting the excess cash policy in 
panel p and zero otherwise; 	
&'1	(ℎ, is function of the amount of 
outstanding shares held by managers; -, are sector dummies (S=10); - are panel dummies 
(P=6); and 0, is the error term. The six panels are composed by three years each; the 
decision of building our approach upon panels instead of yearly observations is taken to 
capture persistency in the choice of the cash policy. 
 
!,	is a set of A control variables to proxy for agency conflicts that are likely 
to influence the level of cash. According to the corporate governance literature, the 
shareholder can reduce agency costs by restructuring the board of directors or reshaping 
managerial incentives (Gillan, 2006). It is argued that the higher the board independence, that 
is the percentage of non-executive directors in the board, the less severe the agency conflicts 
between executive managers and shareholders as independent managers increase the boards' 
monitoring effectiveness which in turn decreases managerial opportunism (Mayers et al., 
1997; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Holderness, 2003; Pass, 2004; Petra, 2005; Harford et al., 
2008; Ameer et al., 2010; Sheikh and Wang, 2012; Jiraporn, 2012). Hence, we add the 
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percentage of non-executive directors in the board and the size of the board to the set of 
regressors. Moreover, the shareholder's incentive to monitor the manager it is known to 
depend on the shareholder's stake into the company. The larger the shareholder's stake, the 
greater is his/her incentive to play a role in the corporate control and reduce the scope for 
managerial opportunism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 1997; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Pergola and Verreault, 2009). Ownership concentration is 
therefore a crucial variable in the analysis of managerial incentives and, to a certain extent, it 
can also exacerbate the firm's agency problems. On the one hand, larger stakes into the 
company allow major shareholders to have greater incentives to monitor managers; on the 
other hand, as the major shareholders gain control of the firm, they can generate private 
benefits that are not shared with minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Therefore, we add alternative measures of ownership concentration as control variables in the 
regression. 
%
&'(!, is a set of J-A variables that proxy for precautionary motives to 
hold high cash. It is argued that firms can adopt high cash policies to cope with adverse 
income shocks, to reduce the firm's dependence on the costly external finance, and to have 
financial flexibility for potential profitable investment opportunities (Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Almeida et al., 2004; 
Han and Qiu, 2007; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Bates et al., 2009; Riddick and Whited, 
2009). There is evidence that older and larger firms are more likely to have easier access to 
capital markets and to face lower costs of temporary shortages in liquid funds (Hennessy and 
Whited, 2007; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). In addition, firms paying dividends have lower 
benefits from holding cash as they cannot use cash in excess to face unexpected adverse 
shocks (Fazzari et al., 1988; Kim et al., 1998; Riddick and Whited, 2009). Previous research 
also suggests that the higher the firm's growth opportunities, the higher the need of 
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accumulating cash (Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Stein, 2003; Han and Qiu, 2007; 
Bates et al., 2009; Brown and Petersen, 2011). We therefore add age, size, dividend and 
market-to-book ratio to the set of regressors. 
 
2.2. Hypotheses testing 
The first hypothesis we test is that, as managerial ownership increases in the U.K., managers 
are less likely to adopt the excess cash policy since, to the extent that the alignment of 
interests is achieved, they are less likely to divert resources away from value maximization 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck et al., 1988; McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2004; Florakis and Ozkan, 2009; McConnel et al., 2008): 
23$:	 Other things being equal, higher managerial ownership aligns interests of managers and 
shareholders and the likelihood of adopting the excess cash policy reduces. We test for 23$ by 
imposing: 
2				ℎ, = 	6$7 8	(ℎ,, 
to model (1), and test the hypothesis that 6$ < 0. 
The second hypothesis we test is that, if the manager holds a large fraction of shares, 
there exists an entrenchment effect. The corporate finance literature suggests that higher 
ownership gives managers a higher control over the firm and then less exposure to the 
external capital market disciplinary pressure (Stulz, 1988). Higher ownership, also, gives 
executives the opportunity to pursue their own agendas with lower threat of being replaced 
(McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 
2007; Harford et al., 2008). Therefore, for sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, 
the larger the amount of shares the managers hold, the more likely the policy of excess cash: 
Page 9 of 37 Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
10 
 
23;:	 Other things being equal, for sufficiently high levels, managerial ownership misaligns 
interests of managers to those of shareholders and increases the likelihood of adopting the 
excess cash policy. We test for 23;	by imposing: 
3				ℎ, = 	6$7 8	(ℎ, + 6;7 8	(ℎ,; , 
to model (1), and test the hypothesis that 6$ < 0 and 6; > 0. 
It is known that role and incentives of the executive directors are different from those 
of the non-executive directors - who are appointed in the shareholders' interests to perform 
monitoring over the executives (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; 
Pass, 2004; Petra, 2005; Davies et al., 2005; Ameer et al., 2010; Sheikh and Wang, 2012). 
Corporate finance studies, therefore, suggest that a broad classification of managerial 
ownership is not sufficient to assess managerial ownership as an adequate incentive 
mechanism (Pergola and Verreault, 2009). The effective monitoring is more likely if the 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of non-executive directors. Concentrated ownership in 
the hands of executives may in fact result in inefficient monitoring and sub-optimal financial 
policies if executives' interests are not aligned with those of the majority of shareholders. 
However, mixed evidence is reported on the relationship between executive (insider) 
ownership and cash level. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), using a sample of U.K. firms during the 
period 1984-1999, find a non-linear relationship between cash and managerial ownership, 
according to the idea that with increased managerial ownership managers avoid high cash 
policies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, at very high levels of managerial ownership, 
managers can accumulate cash in excess for their own interests. Consistently with this, 
Harford et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between insider ownership and cash holdings 
for the U.S. firms, but the coefficient of insider ownership turns out to be significant only at 
the fourth quartile of the cash holdings distribution. They argue this suggests that the true 
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relationship between cash and managerial ownership may be asymmetric and non-linear. 
Therefore, the third hypothesis we test is the following: 
23?:	 Other things being equal, executive ownership aligns interests of executive managers to 
those of shareholders and reduces the likelihood of adopting the excess cash policy. For 
sufficiently high levels, executive ownership entrenches executive managers and increases 
the likelihood of adopting the excess cash policy. We test for 23?	by imposing: 
4				ℎ,
= 	6$	
&'1	(ℎ, + 6;	
&'1	(ℎ,;
+ 6$A(	
&'1	(ℎ,, 
to model (1), and test the hypothesis that 6$ < 0, 6; > 0 and 6? = 0. 
 
3. Data and classification procedure 
3.1. Data 
Our sample of firms includes all publicly traded U.K. firms from DataStream for the period 
1990 to 2007. We exclude from the sample financial firms and observations with missing 
firm-year figures for any variable included in the model. In addition, we do not use 
observations belonging to the period of the financial crisis as there is evidence that firms over 
this period have substantially raised the cash reserves. This may have caused both an increase 
in the number of cash rich firms and the precautionary motive being the main driver of an 
excess cash policy. If this is true, we expect that risk adverse managers would not have 
adjusted the level of firm cash further according to a change in their shares. Instead, in our 
paper we focus on the control of agency conflicts and the management of cash; in particular, 
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on how and whether shares may mitigate the agency conflicts between executive managers 
and shareholders and hence reduce the adoption of an excess cash policy. Finally, we choose 
only those firms with at least six continuous time series observations. These criteria provide 
us with an unbalanced panel of 1,196 firms and 14,317 firm-year observations. 
The choice of analysing the U.K. economy is not without cost for data collection, as 
detailed information on board composition, managers’ compensation and executive and non-
executive ownership is not freely available. Ownership data are collected from many editions 
of the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register. Data on equity ownership are collected for each 
group of directors separately. We collect information on the size of the board, the ratio of 
non-executive directors in the board to the total number of directors, and ownership 
concentration. For the latter we build three alternative proxies: 1. the Herfindahl index, taken 
as the sum of the squares of outstanding shares held by all shareholders with at least 5 percent 
of the total shares; 2. the percentage of outstanding shares held by the largest shareholder; 3. 
the sum of the percentage of outstanding shares held by all shareholders with at least 5 
percent of the total shares. 
Descriptive statistics, reported in Table 1, show that the mean level of cash holdings 
of U.K. firms over the sample period is 13 percent. The median values regarding both the 
ownership concentration and the percentage of executive ownership are smaller than the 
mean values. This suggests that in the U.K. the level of executive ownership is quite 
moderate (Conyon and Sadler, 2005) and there is a strong protection of minority shareholders 
which prevents investors from holding large equity stakes. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
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3.2. Classification scheme 
In order to identify firms that are likely to divert financial resources away from value 
maximization, we define a firm as adopting the excess cash policy if it persistently holds high 
cash levels and it has cash in excess of its optimal level. Providing the theoretical definition is 
less challenging than providing its empirical counterpart as (1) there is no empirical 
definition of high cash the literature agrees upon; (2) the analysis has to take into account the 
theoretical requirement of cash; and (3) it is not straightforward to decide the time period that 
is long enough for the retention of cash to be considered as a persistent choice, and not as a 
random event. 
We approach the question by borrowing from the existing literature the most common 
definitions of high cash firm. Harford et al. (2008) suggest to consider the firm as cash rich if 
it accumulates more cash than the median of the sector it belongs to. This approach relies 
upon the view that measures of centrality of the distribution for the sector contains 
information about the optimal requirement of cash by the firm operating in that particular 
sector. To capture persistency, we require that high cash firms positively deviate from the 
mean of the sector for a three year-period. To avoid overlapping observations, we split the 
entire time span in six panels using three years to build each panel (Table 2). Hence, the first 
group of high cash observations is the set of firms whose level of cash positively deviates 
from a constant sector mean. The mean of each sector is calculated using all available years 
for the sector. However, since the optimal sectorial requirement of cash may change over 
time, we obtain the second group of cash rich firms by allowing the mean of the sector to 
change across panels. We build the third group of cash rich firms by following the Mikkelson 
and Partch (2003) fixed rule approach according to which the firm is defined as being cash 
rich if it holds more than 25 percent of its assets in cash and cash equivalents over the 
required time span. 
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<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
We notice that the approaches above rely on information about centrality measures 
and some fixed classification criteria, without making use of information on clustering in the 
distribution of cash. Actually, research using the entire distribution of one variable suggests 
the use of its empirical shape to identify clusters of units. The underlying idea is that, if it 
there exists a group of observations behaving systematically different form others, these 
observations should be grouped around a mode located on the right tail of the distribution of 
cash (Bianchi, 1997). We take this suggestion on board and identify the fourth group of cash 
rich firms by allowing the distribution of the relevant variable to determine the cut-off point 
and the latter to change over time. We proceed as follows. First, we provide a statistical 
analysis based on the non-parametric estimate of the distribution of cash holdings. We 
estimate T densities of cash holdings, using the Gaussian Kernel and the Least-Squares 
Cross-Validation bandwidth (with T being the number of available years). Second, we define 
a firm as being cash rich if its cash holdings are higher than the last interior minimum of the 
cash holdings distribution for that year. Persistency is captured by requiring firms to be cash 
rich in the panel. 
The criteria above are based on the empirical behaviour of cash and, hence, they do 
not exclude firms holding high cash because the high level of cash is optimal. Indeed, having 
high levels of cash does not necessarily imply that a firm is adopting the excess cash policy 
(Bates et al., 2009). The firm's optimal cash holding is the level of cash holding where 
marginal costs of cash just offset the marginal benefits (Kim et al., 1998). Therefore, we use 
the empirical model of optimal cash holdings, introduced by Opler et al. (1999), to estimate 
the theoretical target level of cash for each firm as: 
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where, ' ∈ , with p=1...6, Cash is the ratio of holdings of cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets; Cash flow is the ratio of pre-tax profits plus depreciation to total assets; Liquidity is 
the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities and total cash to total assets; Investment is 
the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets; Market-to-book is the ratio of book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity to book value of assets; Size is the logarithm of total assets in 
constant prices; -, and -S are sectorial and time dummies respectively. 
To deal with the potential endogeneity of the variables, we average the independent 
variables over the first two years in the panel, and we take the dependent variable in the third 
year of the same panel. We use the estimated parameters from model (5) to calculate the 
target level of cash holdings, Cℎ,∗ 	for each panel. Then, we calculate deviations of 
observed cash holdings from target values as: 
6				∆Cℎ,S	 = Cℎ,S	 − Cℎ,∗ . 
If the firm's cash holding positively deviates for all the years in the panel from its 
target level, we consider the firm as persistently holding more cash than it needs. We 
combine this information with each of the four empirical classification schemes to obtain the 
four groups of firms adopting the excess cash policy. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Classification results 
Figure 1 presents examples that show the advantages of the analysis based on distributions. 
Panel A reports the estimate of the distribution of cash holdings for 2005 and Panel B for 
1995. The solid lines represent the cut-off point for cash, where firms whose cash is located 
to the right of this point are said to adopt the excess cash policy for that year. For comparison 
purposes, the dotted line represents the splitting line resulting from the 25% fixed cash 
classification rule (FCCR25%). The distribution-based approach identifies a cut-off level of 
cash holdings corresponding to a lower ratio of cash holdings than the approach based on 
fixed rule. Results, reported in Panel B, also reveals that the two criteria can provide a 
significantly different splitting point. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 and Table 3 about here> 
 
Results from our classification exercises are reported in Table 3. The first seven rows 
show the total number of firm-year observations we have and the number of firms classified 
under each of the five classification schemes for the six non-overlapping panels. In this table, 
Column 1 reports the number of observations classified as having higher cash than the 
predicted target and Columns 2 to 5 report the observations under the four empirical methods. 
The five classification approaches lead to different results. More specifically, there is a 
substantial difference between the criterion based on a fixed rule and the classification 
scheme based on the shape of the distribution of cash holdings. When combining the 
theoretical approach with each of the four empirical methods, all the figures reduce - see the 
last seven lines of the table. This analysis provides the four groups of firms we define as 
adopting the excess cash policy that are the object of study in the remainder of the paper. 
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4.2. Preliminary evidence 
Table 4 reports tests for difference in means for some of the variables we use in the analysis. 
Column 1 reports results for firms with excess cash according to the joint criteria of cash 
higher than the (constant) mean of the sector and cash higher than the theoretical target. 
Column 2 refers to observations defined with excess cash using the joint criteria of cash 
higher than the (time-varying) mean of the sector and cash higher than the target. Column 3 
reports results for observations using excess cash according to both the 25% rule and to the 
theoretical target. Finally, Column 4 shows the results for observations classified according to 
the cluster analysis and to the theoretical target. Control samples are defined as observations 
not satisfying the corresponding classification criterion. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
By construction, the mean value of cash holdings for firms adopting the excess cash 
policy, using any of the four definitions, is significantly higher than that for firms in each of 
the control samples. There is little evidence that variables, which proxy for the presence of 
agency problems, differ from control firms. The evidence is different if the fixed 
classification rule is used. In this case, executive ownership and ownership concentration are 
significantly higher than in the control firms. These characteristics suggest that, under this 
criterion, the excess cash policy is likely to be driven by entrenched executives with high 
stakes in the firm or by major shareholders who expropriate the minority shareholders 
(McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 
Kuan et al., 2012). 
Results show that firms with cash in excess are younger, and have lower levels of 
leverage than control firms. This suggests that these firms accumulate cash because of 
precautionary motives or because of financing constraints (Kim et al., 1998; Brown and 
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Petersen, 2011). Moreover, the evidence shows that cash rich firms have a smaller number of 
non-executive directors on the board, and under the approach based on distributions, the non-
executive directors have a lower amount of outstanding shares; in turn, this is likely to affect 
their ability of controlling the executives' opportunism. 
Results from the classification exercise show that the approach based on the fixed 
classification rule tends to select small and young firms. Coupled with the size of the board 
being significantly lower than in the control firms, this suggests that the criterion tends to 
select a subsample of firms that is likely to be affected by precautionary behaviour of 
executives who are overly concerned with the firm's risk and consequently they favour a 
higher level of cash (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Friend and Lang, 1988; Berger et al., 1997). On 
the other hand, criteria based on the mean of the sector are able, only to a limited extent, to 
identify the firms we are interested in, as none of the ownership characteristics is statistically 
different from that associated to the control group. 
 
4.3. Results 
Table 5 reports our main results. We begin by presenting results based upon the most 
conservative choices with respect both to the classification criteria and estimators. Results are 
based upon the pooled logit model where the dependent variable is the probability of 
adopting the excess cash policy based on constant sectorial mean and positive deviation from 
the target cash level. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
Column 1 reports results of the test for the first hypothesis we test for. These suggest 
that the market-to-book ratio is positively associated with the probability of adopting the 
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excess cash policy. This is in line with the hypothesis that the greater the investment 
opportunities the greater the need of internal financing especially if financial markets are 
imperfect (Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Harford, 1999; Bates, 2009). Evidence 
suggests that the age of the firm is negatively associated to the probability of adopting the 
excess cash policy, in line with the idea that younger firms are more likely to face financing 
constraints and hence to accumulate cash to finance investments (Oliner and Rudebusch, 
1992; Schaller, 1993; Brown and Petersen, 2011). Against this view is the evidence of an 
insignificant coefficient of firm size. However, this is due to the high correlation between age 
and size, as the latter happens to be statistically significant and with the expected sign if the 
former is excluded from the set of regressors (Kim, et al., 1998). 
Also, results show that the higher the dividends the higher the likelihood of adopting 
the excess cash policy. This result may suggest that, if managers are themselves shareholders, 
they may prefer to accumulate cash in order to secure themselves a high dividend. Under this 
model, the coefficient associated to managerial ownership is statistically significant at 5% 
level, and it shows the expected sign. Therefore, results do not reject the hypothesis that 
managerial ownership aligns interests of managers to those of shareholders and reduces the 
probability of adopting the excess cash policy. In estimating the model in Column (2), we 
expand the set of regressors to include the squared managerial ownership and test for our 
second hypothesis. The coefficient for managerial ownership and its squared value are 
significant at 1% level and show the expected sign. Hence, the hypothesis that the impact of 
managerial ownership on the probability of adopting the excess cash policy depends on the 
level of managerial ownership is not rejected. 
At low levels, the impact of managerial ownership is likely to be negative in support 
of the alignment hypothesis whereas, at high levels, it is likely to be positive in support of the 
entrenchment hypothesis. This result is in line with Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) according to 
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which, high managerial ownership prevents an efficient control of managers that can pursue 
their own objectives, as accumulating cash and consuming perquisites, without fearing 
discipline from other shareholders. For this reason, we use alternative definitions of 
ownership concentration. We replace the Herfindal index with the percentage of shares held 
by the largest shareholder, and with the sum of all shares held by shareholders having more 
than 5% of total shares. Columns (3) and (4) show that our main conclusions are robust to 
this exercise. 
In Column (5) we report results from testing for our third hypothesis. We disentangle 
executive from non-executive ownership and add these to the set of regressors. The third 
hypothesis is not rejected: the estimated coefficient of executive ownership and its square are 
significant at 1% level. Signs are in line with expectations and consistent with our earlier 
findings of a non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and probability of 
adopting the excess cash policy. This conclusion is robust to the presence of the squared 
value of non-executive ownership in the set f repressors, and to alternative measures of 
ownership concentration - for the sake of space these results are not reported. Moreover, the 
coefficients of executive ownership and executive ownership square (in Column 5) are higher 
than those of managerial ownership and managerial ownership square (in Column 4). These 
findings, along with a non-significant coefficient of non-executive ownership, support our 
view that only executive ownership matters in the U.K. for cash policy. Given that the ratio 
of executive directors in the board is higher than that of non-executive directors (see Table 1) 
and the fact that rewards based on shares represent in the U.K. a lower percentage of the 
executive compensation with respect to the US (Conyon et al., 2011), it is important to 
analyse whether a rise in the executive ownership may reduce the degree of asymmetric 
information between executives and shareholders and affect the excess cash policy. 
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4.4. Robustness checks 
We carry out a sensitivity analysis for robustness purposes. The first question we address is 
whether results are robust to the choice of the estimation framework (i.e. the pooled logit 
model augmented for sectorial and time dummies). We choose the pooled logit because a 
firm which adopts the excess cash policy in a panel does not necessarily need to do the same 
in the consecutive panels. Nevertheless, though when taking averages over the three years 
some observations are lost and data are not in a panel form, there is still a certain degree of 
persistency in the firm's behaviour so that firms keep adopting the excess cash policy for a 
certain time span. This suggests that adopting the excess cash policy may be a fixed 
characteristic and, if this is the case, sectorial dummies are not enough to control our results 
for the individual heterogeneity. As a consequence, we use a range of panel data frameworks 
(such as, the random-effect and the fixed-effect panel probability models) to re-estimate all 
the models presented in Table 5. In Table 6 we only report results for the third hypothesis 
tested via the random-effect probit model (Column 1) and the fixed effects logit model 
(Column 2). Results are largely consistent with those reported earlier. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
The second robustness check is related to the definition of the dependent variable. In 
estimating the model in column (3) the binary variable is set equal to one if the firm 
positively deviates both from the time-varying sectorial mean and from the optimal cash 
level; in estimating the model in column (4) we use the fixed classification rule along with 
the optimal cash level and, finally, in estimating the model in column (5) we adopt the 
distribution-based classification rule along with the optimal cash level. Conclusions about 
each of the null hypotheses are robust to these exercises. However, when the criteria using 
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either the fixed classification rule or the shape of the distribution of cash are used, the 
percentage of non-executive directors in the board is statistically significant with a negative 
sign. This supports the hypothesis that boards with a higher representation of non-executive 
directors are more effective in reducing managerial entrenchment (Borokhovich et al., 1996; 
McKnight and Weir, 2009). It is also worth to notice that these models have a significantly 
larger pseudo-R². 
The third concern is related to the robustness of our results to the inclusion of the 
equilibrium determinants in the set of repressors. From the theoretical point of view the 
variables we use to determine the optimal amount of cash the firm holds should not 
necessarily enter the set of repressors. Alternatively, from an empirical perspective these 
variables should also be added to the set of regressors when testing our hypotheses since they 
are likely to be correlated both with the optimal amount of cash and with the deviation from 
such target. Results from this additional exercise are reported in Table 7 and show that the 
decision about rejection of the null hypothesis does not change even augmenting the models 
with this set of variables, either singularly or altogether. 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
All the equilibrium determinants apart from the cash flow are statistically significant, 
and with the expected sign (see Opler et al., 1999). This suggests that variables determining 
the equilibrium level may impact the probability of adopting the excess cash policy with the 
same sign. The asymmetry we find in performing this robustness exercise suggests to perform 
the entire exercise after adding the level of executive ownership to the set of repressors when 
estimating the equilibrium level. Indeed, if ownership is omitted from the determinants of the 
optimal level of cash, then residuals from a cash regression that excludes ownership are likely 
to be correlated to this (omitted) variable. This can cause a spurious correlation between 
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excess cash and executive ownership. Therefore, we estimate the optimal level of cash by 
augmenting the Opler et al. (1999) model with executive ownership. 
Finally, since shocks affecting the probability of adopting the excess cash policy are 
likely to affect some of the independent variables, we check our results for endogeneity 
issues. In this framework it is difficult to find a set of suitable instruments for each of the 
regressors; hence, we take advantage of the time structure of the data to control, to some 
extent, our results for endogeneity. To this aim, we repeat all the exercises by taking the 
average of the independent variables over the first two years of each panel, and using these as 
repressors in a model where the dependent variable is taken at the last year of the panel. 
Results from the last two exercises are largely consistent with those presented in Table 5 and 
are available upon request from the authors. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper tests the impact of executive ownership on the probability of adopting the excess 
cash policy in the U.K. We provide a definition of excess cash policy that relies on empirical 
criteria based upon both moments of the distribution of cash and fixed classification rules and 
eventual clustering in the distribution itself. We combine empirical criteria and classification 
rules with a theoretical target. Then, given the fact that U.K. boards are dominated by 
executive directors and rewards based on shares represent in the U.K. a lower percentage of 
the executive compensation with respect to the U.S., we examine the role of the executive 
ownership in the excess cash policy. In particular, we test the hypothesis that the alignment-
entrenchment effect of managerial ownership exists, and that this effect goes through its 
executive component. Results suggest that the relationship between executive ownership and 
the probability of using an excess cash policy is non-monotonic. There is an alignment of 
interests between managers and shareholders at low levels of executive ownership and an 
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entrenchment at high levels that is likely to cause managers having more discretion to hoard 
cash reserves. 
Our results suggest that U.K. firms adopting an excess cash policy have a higher 
executive ownership and a lower number of non-executive directors on the board, with 
respect to control firms. This evidence may suggest that firms have adopted excess cash 
policies because of executive ownership being possibly in the range where entrenchment 
becomes feasible. This is consistent with the evidence that in the U.K. non-executive 
directors and directors with large shares tend to entrench management by reducing board 
turnover (Franks et al., 2001).  
It is also consistent with the evidence that, differently from the U.S., in the U.K. the 
ineffective implementation of fiduciary responsibilities results in non-executive directors 
playing a primarily advisory rather than a disciplinary role (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Franks, 2001; Pass, 2004; Petra, 2005). Finally, this result is in line with the evidence that in 
the U.K. a lack of external market discipline and efficient monitoring by financial institutions 
makes executives more likely to be entrenched (Franks, 2001; Goergen and Renneboog, 
2001). 
This paper extends or encompasses several previous studies in considering the impact 
of the executive ownership on the probability of adopting an excess cash policy. Our findings 
have a number of implications for future research and practice. In particular, in this paper we 
provide a measure of the “excess target cash” for the firm by answering the question of “how 
much cash is too much”. As a result, if cash rich firms identified by previous studies were 
actually firms with “normal” levels of cash, then the interpretation of previous results would 
be decisively under question. Moreover, our evidence suggest that researchers should take 
into account that the number of firms classified as adopting an excess cash policy may 
depend on the criterion (theoretical and/or empirical) they use to identify those firms. Also, 
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our measure of excess cash policy allows identifying, in practice, levels of cash which are 
“abnormal” with respect to an “equilibrium level” and how financial and governance 
variables contribute to explain the out-of-equilibrium persistency in the cash level. In 
particular for the U.K, our findings suggest that, if U.K. firms have adopted excess cash 
policies because of a poor governance system, then U.K. firms should be cautious in using 
executive ownership as a corporate governance mechanism: managerial ownership seems to 
be a controversial corporate governance mechanism to motivate managers, as it may enter the 
range where entrenchment becomes feasible and generates suboptimal cash holdings and firm 
value. 
Our findings also validate that firms using an excess cash policy are younger and have 
a lower level of leverage than that of control firms. This indicates that an excess cash policy 
might be driven not only by poor corporate governance, but also by the interplay between 
agency costs of managerial opportunism and cost of the external finance. In particular, it is 
known that investors will charge a higher cost of external finance for firms whose managers 
are thought to waste or use funds inefficiently (Huang et al., 2009). Therefore, when a 
substantial increase in the executive ownership introduces an alignment effect, investors will 
charge the firm a lower cost of external finance (Huang et al., 2009). This in turn will 
increase the ability to raise debt and will decrease both the need of accumulating cash 
holdings and the sensitivity of investment to cash holdings. However, at high level of 
managerial ownership, a further increase in managerial shares may create an entrenchment 
effect and therefore an increase in the cost of external finance for taking the severe agency 
risk, which will decrease the ability to raise debt and will increase both the need of 
accumulating cash holdings (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003) and the sensitivity of 
investment to cash holdings. In an effort to control parameters for the impacts other than 
those we are interested in, we have kept constant variables measuring both the cost of 
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external finance and the degree of agency problems. However, these impacts are 
interdependent and disentangling these effects on cash policy is challenging due to a paucity 
of valid instruments and accurate proxies for important variables. Further research is 
therefore needed to take into account this kind of endogeneity and explore alternative 
explanations of our findings. 
Finally, the dangers of a high-risk culture in finance were uncovered in the recent 
crisis and have affected firm capital structure and therefore the target level of cash. Our 
approach, which takes into account the evolution of cash distribution over time, can be used 
to explore whether excess cash holdings of U.K. firms and the impact of managerial 
ownership on this excess target have changed from before the crisis to after the crisis.  
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Min 25% Median Mean 75% Max
Cash Holdings 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.94
Leverage 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.18 0.25 1.00
Market-to-Book 0.20 1.03 1.33 1.62 1.81 9.89
Cash Flow -2.00 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.13 1.40
Liquidity -2.00 -0.07 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.61
Size 3.44 9.51 10.54 10.84 11.96 18.40
Profitability -2.00 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.42
Dividend -2.00 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.23 1.12
Cap_Ex 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.68
Fixed Assets 0.00 0.19 0.32 0.36 0.48 0.95
Age 0.00 4.00 7.00 9.15 12.00 17.00
Executive Ownership (%) 0.00 0.20 2.68 10.72 15.12 83.43
Nonexecutive Ownership (%) 0.00 0.02 0.17 2.55 1.60 67.23
Block Ownership (>5%) 0.00 9.30 21.20 23.83 35.03 100.00
Largest Owner (%) 5.00 10.09 14.68 19.04 22.92 100.00
Herfindahl 294.55 398.58 571.33 873.48 945.22 7505.21
Board Size (log) 0.00 1.70 1.95 1.93 2.14 3.09
Nonexecutive Directors (%) 0.00 0.31 0.42 0.41 0.50 1.00
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1
The descriptive statistics are presented on the basis of six non-overlapping panels.
Panel A B C D E F
Years
In each panel, each firm has three years of complete information on each variable. Firms are required to
survive at least six years, two non-overlapping periods, throughtout the sample period 1990-2007.
Table 2
Panel Formation
[2002-2004] [2005-2007][1990-1992] [1993-1995] [1996-1998] [1999-2001]
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Control E.C. Control E.C. Control E.C. Control E.C. 
Cash Holdings 0.059 0.253 0.059 0.255 0.085 0.465 0.068 0.299
Leverage 0.195 0.135 0.195 0.134 0.187 0.074 0.193 0.117
Size 10.838 10.850 10.841 10.841 10.898 9.976 10.850 10.796
Age 9.326 8.627 9.339 8.584 9.305 6.806 9.318 8.351
Executive Ownership 10.667 10.885 10.566 11.184 10.433 15.189 10.568 11.436
Nonexecutive Ownership 2.607 2.386 2.602 2.404 2.533 2.859 2.634 2.167
Block Ownership (>5%) 23.863 23.715 23.868 23.701 23.746 25.058 23.857 23.682
Largest Owner 18.920 19.397 18.884 19.496 18.782 22.882 18.943 19.482
Herfindahl 866.89 893.81 863.76 902.82 857.90 1127.72 871.10 884.78
Board Size 1.923 1.933 1.923 1.933 1.930 1.857 1.925 1.931
Nonexecutive Directors 0.414 0.406 0.413 0.407 0.415 0.370 0.414 0.400
t -value 
t -value 
t -value 
t -value 
t -value 
t -value
t -value 
t -value 
t -value 
t -value
3.12*** 1.02
0.17 -0.01
0.30 0.86
Table 4
Variables
Column 1 reports results from the classification scheme using the constant mean of the sector the firm belongs to
and positive deviations from optimal cash. Column 2 reports results from the classification scheme using the time
varying mean of the sector the firm belongs to and positive deviations from optimal cash. Column 3 reports
results from the classification scheme using the 25% constant rule and positive deviations from optimal cash.
Column 4 reports results from the classification scheme using last interior minimum of the cash distribution and
positive deviations from optimal cash. E.C. stands for Excess Cash. ***, **, and * indicate that the null hypothesis 
of equality of means is rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level.
Test for Difference in Means
Time-Varying 
Mean Rule & Cash 
Higher than 
Optimum
25% Rule & Cash 
Higher than 
Optimum
Distribution Rule 
& Cash Higher 
than Optimum
4
37.87***
-12.67*** -12.77*** -14.80*** -14.54***
-0.19 -0.21
-8.25*** -0.67
0.88 -0.21
-2.83*** -3.05*** -7.65*** -3.53***
0.67 -1.80*-0.85 -0.77
0.77 0.98 2.98*** 0.75
0.68 0.98 2.73*** 0.3
0.63 0.65 -2.52*** 0.37
-1.07 -0.87 -2.98*** -1.65*
t -value     
1 2 3
Constant Mean 
Rule & Cash 
Higher than 
Optimum
39.91*** 40.24*** 40.76***
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -2.350 -0.808 -1.928 -1.843 -1.892
(-3.47)*** (0.24) (-2.70)*** (-2.51)** (-2.59)***
Size -0.031 -0.065 -0.069 -0.059 -0.059
(-0.74) (-1.46) (-1.53) (-1.28) (-1.29)
Market-to-Book 0.381 0.384 0.369 0.368 0.374
(7.61)*** (7.65)*** (7.44)*** (7.46)*** (7.56)***
Age -0.018 -0.019 -0.013 -0.019 -0.019
(-2.27)** (-2.41)** (-1.69)* (-2.41)** (-2.38)**
Dividend 1.743 1.698 1.958 1.972 1.970
(5.21)*** (5.08)*** (5.92)*** (6.06)*** (6.06)***
Board Size 0.132 0.167 0.188 0.103 0.114
(0.60) (0.76) (0.86) (0.49) (0.53)
Nonexecutive Directors -0.237 -0.328 -0.378 -0.487 -0.465
(-0.60) (-0.82) (-0.99) (-1.31) (-1.18)
Ownership Concentration 4.31e
-5
-2.35e
-5
-3.03e
-5
4.07e
-5
2.36e
-5
(0.64) (-0.32) (-0.64) (0.12) (0.07)
Managerial Ownership -0.009 -0.034 -0.033 -0.034
(-2.26)** (-3.31)*** (-3.44)*** (-3.52)***
Managerial Ownership
2
4.54e
-4
5.10e
-4
4.99e
-4
(2.68)*** (3.38)*** (3.44)***
Executive Ownership -0.036
(-3.52)***
Executive Ownership
2
5.81e
-4
(3.67)***
Nonexecutive Ownership -0.012
(-1.28)
Pseudo-R
2 0.047 0.049 0.051 0.051 0.053
All models refer to the definition of excess cash policy based on sectoral constant mean and
positive deviation from optimal cash. In all models, i is the observation and p is the panel. In
models (1) and (2) Ownership Concentration is measured as the Herfindahl index; in model (3)
Ownership Concentration is the percentage of shares of the largest shareholder; in model (4) and
(5) it is defined as the sum of all shares for shareholders having more than 5% of shares. All
models are estimated by means of a pooled logit model, including panel and sectoral dummies,
where i is the observation and p is the panel. t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and *
indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level.
Table 5
Main Results
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -1.324 -2.080 0.747 -2.433
(-1.70)* (-2.85)*** (0.70) (-1.92)*
Size -0.044 -0.059 -0.049 -0.270 -0.169
(-0.88) (-1.29) (-1.07) (-3.60)*** (-2.66)***
Market-to-Book 0.270 0.373 0.407 0.492 0.472
(5.53)*** (7.55)*** (8.22)*** (7.66)*** (8.15)***
Age -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.041 -0.026
(-2.24)** (-2.38)** (-2.44)** (-2.55)** (-2.11)**
Dividend 1.065 1.967 2.095 2.684 2.690
(4.15)*** (6.06)*** (6.44)*** (5.54)*** (6.27)***
Board Size -0.070 0.114 0.089 0.179 0.028
(-0.34) (0.53) (0.42) (0.53) (0.10)
Nonexecutive Directors -0.010 -0.464 -0.546 -1.476 -1.253
(-0.03) (-1.18) (-1.39) (-2.35)** (-2.33)**
Ownership Concentration 3.41e
-4
2.35e
-4
2.35e
-3
4.24e
-3
2.76e
-3
(0.11) (0.07) (0.72) (0.80) (0.61)
Executive Ownership -0.022 -0.036 -0.034 -0.032 -0.024
(-2.14)** (-3.51)*** (-3.28)*** (-2.07)** (-1.99)**
Executive Ownership
2
3.69e
-4
5.81e
-4
5.55e
-4
5.49e
-4
4.09e
-4
(2.34)** (3.67)*** (3.54)*** (2.41)** (2.19)**
Nonexecutive Ownership -0.007 -0.012 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007
(-0.8) (-1.27) (-1.11) (-0.53) (-0.50)
Pseudo-R
2
- - 0.057 0.135 0.111
Model (1) is estimated by means of a random effect probit model. Model (2) is estimated by means
of a fixed effects logit model. Models (3), (4) and (5) are estimated by means of a pooled logit
model. All models include time and sectoral dummies except from model (2) which includes time
dummies only. Model (3) refers to the definition of excess cash policy based on sectoral time
varying mean and positive deviation from optimal cash. Model (4) refers to the definition of
excess cash policy based on fixed 25% cash holdings and positive deviation from optimal cash.
Model (5) refers to the definition of excess cash policy based on the shape of the cash distribution
and positive deviation from optimal cash. t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and *
indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level.
Table 6
Robustness to the Estimation Framework and Classification Schemes
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -1.860 -1.695 -1.603 -1.872 -0.767
(-2.54)** (-2.32)** (-2.18)** (-2.51)** (-1.01)
Size -0.062 -0.044 -0.070 0.033 0.016
(-1.35) (-0.97) (-1.53) (0.70) (0.34)
Market-to-Book 0.370 0.404 0.335 0.309 0.263
(7.41)*** (8.04)*** (6.60)*** (5.94)*** (4.80)***
Age -0.019 -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 -0.016
(-2.40)** (-2.55)** (-2.24)** (-2.27)** (-1.98)**
Dividend 1.915 1.882 1.989 1.306 1.100
(5.77)*** (5.83)*** (6.12)*** (4.16)*** (3.56)***
Board Size 0.111 0.107 0.112 0.042 0.010
(0.52) (0.50) (0.52) (0.19) (0.04)
Nonexecutive Directors -0.455 -0.427 -0.481 -0.076 -0.054
(-1.15) (-1.08) (-1.22) (-0.19) (-0.13)
Ownership Concentration 1.11e
-4
-4.63e
-4
-8.89e
-5
-9.80e
-4
-9.83e
-4
(0.52) (-0.14) (-0.03) (0.30) (-0.29)
Executive Ownership -0.037 -0.034 -0.037 -0.033 -0.031
(-3.54)*** (-3.23)*** (-3.55)*** (-3.12)*** (-2.88)***
Executive Ownership
2
5.82e
-4
5.44e
-4
5.97e
-4
5.43e
-4
5.25e
-4
(3.67)*** (3.41)*** (3.74)*** (3.39)*** (3.19)***
Nonexecutive Ownership -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.016 -0.015
(-1.28) (-1.13) (-1.35) (-1.71)* (-1.46)
Cash Flow 0.353 0.290
(0.78) (0.59)
Capital Expenditure -6.323 -7.878
(-5.57)*** (-6.35)***
Liquidity -1.029 -2.336
(-3.50)*** (-7.06)***
Leverage -4.621 -5.009
(-8.80)*** (-9.66)***
Pseudo-R
2
0.053 0.066 0.057 0.087 0.117
All models refer to the definition of excess cash policy based on sectoral constant mean and
positive deviation from optimal cash and are estimated by means of a pooled logit model,
including panel and sectoral dummies, where i is the observation and p is the panel. t
statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%,
5%, and 10% confidence level. 
Table 7
Robustness to Equilibrium Determinants
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